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satisfy the obligation as did an employer 
under § 6303(a). The court observed that 
"[i]n a civil action service of the govern-
ment's complaint provides the [third-party 
lender] with all the notice required .... " 
781 F.2d 974 at 981 (3d Cir. 1986). 
Jersey Shore, dissatisfied with the court's 
ruling, petitioned the Supreme Court for a 
writ of certiorari. The Court granted the 
writ in order to resolve the inter-circuit 
conflict. The Court then went on to affirm 
the decision of the Third Circuit. 
ChiefJustice Rehnquist, writing for the 
Court, observed that there are three grounds 
for demonstrating a lack of connection be-
tween § 6303(a) and § 3505. First, I.R.C. 
§ 3505 does not declare that a lender is 
"liable for unpaid taxes" which would give 
rise to the I.R.C. § 6303(a) notice require-
ment. Rather, a lender's liability under 
§ 3505 only arises if it pays wages directly 
to an employee or supplies funds for the 
wages with actual notice or knowledge that 
the employer is either unable to make 
timely payment of the withholding taxes 
or has no intention of doing so. The Court 
found that a third-party lender is deemed 
to have such actual notice or knowledge 
from the time- in the exercise of due dili-
gence-the lender would have been aware 
that the employer would not or could not 
make timely payments. "[A] prudent lender 
could be alerted to its liability under sec-
tion 3505 at the time it engaged in what 
the government describes as net payroll 
financing .... " ld. at 87,115 (1987). Fur-
thermore, the Court noted that, "[S]ureties 
can protect themselves against any losses 
attributable to withholding taxes by in-
cluding this risk ofliability in establishing 
their premiums, and lenders by including 
the amounts in their loans and taking ade-
quate security." Citing, S. Rep. No. 1708, 
89th Cong., 2d Sess., 23 (1966); H.R. 
Rep. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 22 
(1966). 
Secondly, the Court considered the fact 
that employers and lenders are in different 
positions. While employers are subject to 
the government's summary collection pro-
cedures soon after unpaid employment 
taxes are assessed, the government may 
only forcibly collect against a lender by 
filing a civil suit in court. Thus, an em-
ployer has a far greater need for an assess-
ment notice than a third-party lender who 
is not subject to summary collection pro-
cedures. 
Lastly, the Court considered the actual 
content of the§ 6303(a) notice. Under this 
section, the government must not only give 
notice to each person liable for unpaid tax 
but the notice must contain 1) the amount 
assessed and 2) the demand for payment. 
The Court pointed out that a third-party 
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lender generally will not be concerned with 
the amount assessed because it may include 
the employer's share of the unpaid Social 
Security taxes for which the lender is not 
liable. See, H.R. Rep. No. 1884, 89th 
Cong., 2d Sess., 21 (1966). Thus, the no-
tice required under § 6303(a) is likely to 
demand payment for an amount different 
from that for which the lender is liable. 
This ruling by the Supreme Court makes 
clear that any lender who engages in net 
payroll financing is subject to suit, without 
the notice provided under 6303(a), if the 
employer fails to pay or deposit the required 
withholding taxes and the lender can be 
said to have actual notice or knowledge 
that the employer is not making timely 
withholding taxes. 
-Robert R. Tousey 
Kuykendall v. Top Notch Laminates, 
Inc.: MARYLAND REFUSES TO 
MAKE EMPLOYERS LIABLE FOR 
INJURIES CAUSED BY 
EMPLOYEES WHO BECAME 
INTOXICATED AT THEIR 
OFFICE PARTIES 
In Kuykendall v. Top Notch Laminates, 
Inc., No. 711 (Md. App. filed Feb. 9, 1987), 
the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, 
affirmed the dismissal from the Circuit 
Court for Montgomery County, by hold-
ing that an employer who allegedly served 
alcohol to an employee at a party, who later 
crashed his car into an automobile, was not 
liable for his employee's actions. 
Because the case was dismissed below, 
under Maryland Rule 2-322(2), the factual 
allegations advanced to Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland were taken directly 
from the complaint, averring that Evelyn 
Hargis was killed instantly when the ve-
hicle she was driving was struck head-on 
on December 23, 1985. Ms. Hargis was 
survived by her husband Jesse W. Kuy-
kendall, and a minor daughter, Christina. 
The complaint stated that Charles E. 
Wilkes, Jr. and Robert Dean Wade, em-
ployees of Top Notch Laminates, Inc. 
(Top Notch), "were driving their separate 
cars while drunk." According to the allega-
tions contained in the complaint, Wilkes 
and Wade were "swerving back and forth 
on the roadway trying to pass or to prevent 
the other from passing." During their 
"horse-play", Wilkes "swerved across 
the center line at a high rate of speed di-
rectly into the path of the car driven by 
Ms. Hargis." (slip op. at p. 1). 
Immediately prior to this occurrence 
both Wilkes and Wade had been attending 
a Christmas party hosted by their employer 
Top Notch, attendance to which was not 
required. (Emphasis supplied). The com-
plaint averred that Wilkes and Wade had 
been drinking "constantly from 12:30 p.m. 
to 5:00 p.m. and became highly intoxi-
cated." The complaint further indicated 
that Top Notch knew of their intoxicated 
condition, but continued to serve both men 
alcoholic beverages. (Id. slip op. at 2). 
From these facts Mr. Kuykendall filed suit 
against Top Notch, for himself, as personal 
representative of Ms. Hargis' estate, and 
for the couple's minor daughter, Christina 
(Appellants). The Circuit Court for Mont-
gomery County granted Top Notch's mo-
tion to dismiss, with which this appeal 
ensued. 
On appeal, the court of special appeals 
was presented with the question of whether 
the employer could be held accountable 
for the actions ofWade and Wilkes, under 
traditional theories of negligence. As a pre-
liminary matter, the court reviewed the 
elements of a negligence cause of action, 
(1) a legal duty, (2) a failure to perform the 
duty, (3) damage to the plaintiff, and (4) the 
damage occasioned by the defendant's fail-
ure to perform the duty. The appellants 
first argued that the legal duty owed by 
Top Notch was established because of the 
"special relationship" established between 
employer and employee. The appellants 
theory was based upon the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, 315, which provides: 
"There is no duty so to control the con-
duct of a third person as to prevent him 
from causing physical harm to another 
unless 
(a) a special relation exists between the 
actor and the third person which im-
poses a duty upon the actor to control 
the third person's conduct, or 
(b) a special relation exists between the 
actor and the other which gives to the 
other a right to protection." (Emphasis 
added). !d. slip op. at 6. 
The appellants alleged that this relation-
ship "conferred a duty upon Top Notch 
(the actor) to control the actions of Wilkes 
(the third person), as well as a duty to the 
general public to protect them from injury 
by Wilkes." (Id. slip op. at 6). This duty, 
appellants argued, was then breached when 
Top Notch permitted Wilkes and Wade to 
drive their own cars, because Top Notch 
chose not to prevent the two men from 
driving home while intoxicated. 
Appellants' second argument was that 
the employer failed to exercise reasonable 
care to avoid injury to third persons, thereby 
relying on Otis Engineering Corp. v. Clark, 
668 S. W .2d 307 ( 1983). In Otis, the Texas 
Supreme Court decided that, "an employer 
who knew his employee was incapacitated 
because of intoxication but nevertheless 
escorted the employee to a motor vehicle 
and allowed him to drive away could be 
negligent." The Texas Supreme Court al-
lowed the suit because in their view the 
employer had "failed to exercise reason-
able care to avoid injury to third persons." 
(/d. slip op. at 7). 
The Court of Special Appeals of Mary-
land in their opinion initially noticed the 
similarity between the appellants' cause of 
action and Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 
4 76 A.2d 1219 ( 1984), a case decided by 
the Supreme Court ofNew Jersey. After 
stating the issue of whether an employer 
who negligently "promotes and permits the 
intoxication of an employee at the employ-
er's premises during business hours and in 
the course of an employer's party, and know-
ingly allows the intoxicated employee to 
drive from his employment and negligently 
collide with and kill another" can be held 
liable, the court examined the line of cases 
preceding the Kelly holding. Kelly stood 
for the proposition in New Jersey that a host 
at a party could be liable to a third party for 
actions of "a person who was drunk and 
who subsequently, in a motor vehicle colli-
sion, negligently injured the third party." 
(/d. slip op. at 3). The court in the case at 
bar clearly rejected such an application of 
the Kelly holding in Maryland, stating that 
Kelly did not suddenly appear, but "was 
the end product of a progression of deci-
sions." /d. slip op. at 3. See Rappaport v. 
Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959); 
Soronen v. Olde Milford Inn, Inc., 46 N.J. 
582, 218 A.2d 630 ( 1966); Linn v. Rand, 
140 N.J.Super. 212, 356 A.2d 15 (1976). 
The court continued that such an adoption 
would be "out-of-the-blue", and not war-
ranted because the general progression of 
cases preceding the Kelly decision in New 
Jersey, are not present in Maryland. Fur-
ther, Maryland has "not adopted Kelly nor 
has it seen fit, either judicially or legisla-
tively, to embrace a dram shop law action." 
See Felder v. Butler, 292 17 4, 438 A.2d 494 
( 1981 ); State v. Hatfield, 197 Md. 249, 78 
A.2d 754 (1951); Fisherv. O'Connor's, Inc., 
53 Md.App. 338, 452 A.2d 1313 (1982). 
Continuing, the court opined that Fisher 
had specifically rejected the New Jersey 
decision in Rappaport, 53 Md.App. at 
340, and that other jurisdictions shared 
the Maryland view. 
The court then examined the argument 
presented by the appellants regarding the 
"special relationship." Although the court 
acknowledged that the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland in Ashburn v. Anne Arundel 
County, 306 Md. 617, 510 A.2d 1078 
(1986), and Lamb v. Hopkins, 303 Md. 
236, 492 A.2d 1297 ( 1985), had adopted 
the principle that there is no liability to a 
third person absent a "special relationship" 
with a clear right to control, the court in 
Kuykendall found that there was "nothing 
in the matter sub judice to suggest that Top 
Notch had a right to control Wilke's ac-
tions after business hours." (/d. slip op. 
at 6). In applying settled Maryland case 
law, the court found a number of factors 
for not imposing liability on the employer, 
Top Notch. The court stated that "for an 
employer to be vicariously liable for the 
acts of an employee, the employee must be 
acting within the scope of his or her em-
ployment." Dhanraj v. Pepco, 305 Md. 
623, 506 A.2d 224 (1986); Watson v. 
Grimm, 200 Md. 461,90 A.2d 180 (1951). 
First, the court found that the appellants 
had not indicated in their complaint that 
Wilkes was acting within the scope of his 
employment when the collision occurred. 
Second, the accident took place off the 
business premises, after working hours, 
and Wilkes was operating his own vehicle. 
Third, the court reasoned since the party 
was not mandatory, the party could not 
have been furthering a business purpose of 
the employer, and therefore the employer 
could not be held vicariously liable for the 
acts of its employee, Wilkes. /d. slip op. 
at 7. 
When the court examined the second 
argument of the appellants it noted that 
Otis apparently followed a California case, 
Brockett v. Kitchen Boyd Motor Co., 264 
Cal.App. 2d 69, 70 Cal.Rptr. 136 (1968). 
The California court found that "affirma-
tive acts" of the employer, and ordering 
him to drive home "imposed a duty on the 
employer to exercise reasonable care." /d. 
slip op. at 8. The Court ofSpecial Appeals 
of Maryland then distinguished the Otis 
and Brockett cases, by examining Pinkham 
v. Apple Computer, Inc., 699 S.W.2d 387 
(Tex.App. 1985). Pinkham dealt with an 
employee at a company cookout. The 
court there in holding for Apple Com-
puter, Inc. found that the company did not 
take any affirmative acts. Similarly, the 
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland 
found that Top Notch took no affirmative 
act with respect to Wilke's operation of a 
motor vehicle. /d. slip op. at 9. 
In addition to examining the appellants' 
arguments, the court examined the legisla-
tive intent in expressly not establishing a 
dram shop act. The court stated that the 
legislature, not the courts, should create 
such an act. The court pointed out that re-
cent annual meetings of the General As-
sembly had not deemed such an act neces-
sary. One explanation offered by the Court 
of Special Appeals of Maryland was the 
illogic of holding an employer liable when 
an employee voluntarily becomes intoxi-
cated and then injures a third party while 
liquor licensees, those in the business of 
dispensing alcoholic beverages, are not 
civilly liable to injured third persons. See 
Felder v. Butler, 292 Md. 174, 438 A.2d 
494 (1981); Fisher v. O'Connor's, Inc., 53 
Md.App. 338, 452 A.2d 1313 (1982). 
The Court of Special Appeals of Mary-
land has declined the opportunity to expand 
the law to allow the recovery of damages 
from employers under the circumstances 
of this case, which might have been called 
"The Employers' Dram Shop Law." The 
lack of an affirmative act by Top Notch, or 
a showing of vicarious liability by the ap-
pellants was decided by the court to leave 
the question of imposing such liability on 
employers in the hands of either the Gen-
eral Assembly or the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland in its role as "law giver". 
-Robert L. Kline, III 
Attorney Grievance Commission v. 
Gilbert: ATTORNEY DISBARRED 
FOR FAILURE TO DISCLOSE 
MATERIAL INFORMATION ON 
HIS BAR APPLICATION 
In Attorney Grievance Commission v. 
Gilbert, 307 Md. 481, 515 A.2d 454 
( 1986), Gilbert was disbarred due to his 
failure to disclose, what the court con-
sidered, material information on his bar 
application. The court of appeals rendered 
this extreme sanction because of the seri-
ousness of Gilbert's misconduct, which re-
flected on his fitness to practice law. 
The nondisclosed item was Gilbert's 
answer to question ten on his 1980 ap-
plication. Question ten required: 
"a complete list of all suits in equity, 
actions at law, suits in bankruptcy or 
other statutory proceedings, matters 
in probate, lunacy, guardianship, and 
every other judicial or administrative 
proceedings of every nature and kind, 
except criminal proceedings to which 
I am or have ever been a party. (If 
'NONE' so state)." 
Gilbert at 457. 
The answer given was "NONE". In 
reality, Gilbert had filed a civil suit in the 
Circuit Court of Baltimore County on June 
4, 1970 to recover the benefits of two in-
surance policies on his wife's life, which he 
obtained three months prior to her mur-
der. The problem with the nondisclosure, 
which made it material, was that Gilbert 
was found in the civil trial to have had a 
part in the murder, consequently he was 
denied recovery. Specifically, Judge Proc-
tor, who heard the civil trial, commented 
in his opinion that "[T]he evidence is over-
whelming that Gilbert intentionally caused 
the death of his wife in order to reap the 
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